Was YOUR vote counted? (feat. homomorphic encryption) - Numberphile

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Recommends pdkl95 · 2016-11 · on “Computer scientists urge Clinton campaign to challenge election results”

Andrew Appel (CS Prof. at Princeton) also gave a very good talk earlier this year about the problems of electronic voting systems. [LINK] edit: Also, Ron Rivest was recently on Numberphile, where he talked about using homomorphic encryption to enable end-to-end verifiable voting. [this video]

Recommends khrm · 2017-08 · on “To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software”

I find Rivest's video( [this video] ) on homomorphic encryption as voting mechanism quite interesting. It looks more secure than pen and paper. All user get a receipt which they can verify is same during vote counting. They themselves can vote count using all others receipt. At the same time, they can't sell their vote as it's encrypted.

Recommends YokoZar · 2019-05 · on “Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting”

The mechanism for voter verification is based on homomorphic encryption. Numberphile made a video on this topic recently, with a few basic explainers: [this video]

Recommends YokoZar · 2019-05 · on “Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting”

Right - the way you verify that is by asking for 100 sealed Alice envelopes, and opening 99 of them at random. If the machine was trying to trick you, you have a strong chance of catching it. You still walk out with a sealed envelope, and the would-be vote-buyer can't be sure it isn't a Bob envelope. This Numberphile video explains the process a bit more: [this video]

Recommends PyroLagus · 2019-06 · on “A Peer to Peer Voting Algorithm [pdf]”

> I've seen many proposed implementations but they all fail because if I can prove my vote to myself in any way, someone else can make me prove it to them either to buy or coerce my ballot. There is a way to prove that your vote was counted without being able to prove what you voted for by using homomorphic encryption. So, if someone wanted to coerce you or pay you for voting at all for whomever you want, they could do it, but that's fine. Microsoft is actually working with Galois on a system operating on this principle[1], and here's a good video explaining the basic concepts of how it works[2]. [1] [LINK] [2] [this video]

Recommends c1ccccc1 · 2024-11 · on “Colorado scrambles to change voting-system passwords after accidental leak”

Cryptographers are clever and have figured out a way to let you know your vote was counted without being able to prove it to a third party! [this video]

Cites tajen · 2016-11 · on “Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine”

@jjuhl answered that question somewhere else in the thread with homomorophic encryption (Numberphile : [this video] ): The hash out of the machine doesn't tell who you voted for, but the sum of the hashes do tally properly. It's still unclear for me, but it's sure that there are mathematical solutions.

Cites simias · 2017-07 · on “Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon”

Even if the machines were open source you'd have to personally inspect it to make sure it's actually running what it's supposed to be running. Unless you're reading to bring an electron microscope to the polling booth it doesn't seem particularly practical. It would make more sense to check whether your vote was counted post-facto but it's hard to especially if you still want to make it difficult to figure out who voted for whom. There are a few mathematical possibilities but they don't seem particularly practical to me: [this video] So for the time being paper ballots are probably the way to go.