DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation (w speaker)
Why Hacker News recommends it
HN cites it in ECC memory debates and bit-flip discussions as concrete evidence that memory errors have real security consequences.
What it is
Artem Dinaburg's DEF CON 19 talk on bit-squatting, where flipped bits in DRAM cause devices to contact domains that differ by one bit from legitimate ones. He shows how registering such domains can hijack traffic without exploiting any software bug.
Recommended by 2 HN commenters across 2 different months, 2016 to 2024.
What Hacker News said
Recommends auganov · 2017-05 · on “Intel Announces Skylake-X: Bringing 18-Core HCC Silicon to Consumers”
I'm sure all of you who love debating ECC will enjoy this defcon video: [this video] "DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation (w speaker)"
Recommends sithadmin · 2021-09 · on “Cosmic Rays Flipping Bits”
There was a good Defcon talk about some security implications of this phenomenon (specifically, DNS squatting) around a decade ago: [this video]
Cites hobs · 2016-02 · on “SSD reliability in the real world: Google's experience”
Google is quite famous for running their data centers hotter than others. * Title makes it obvious, but 95f : [LINK] * Increased in dns request failures(likely due to said heat) and bad routing cause internal iGoogle services to request this guy's stuff: [this video]
Cites marichards · 2018-10 · on “Ask HN: Difference between HTTPS vs. encrypting at the application layer?”
Depends on how you encrypt over HTTP. You can achieve similar benefits of verification with PGP and similarly rich object level encryption. Be careful of gotchas in how PGP or similar work, if you choose it (notable what is or isn't plaintext). Object level encryption typically allows for better separation of concerns as it does not bottleneck to a unique domain:port to seperate encryption contexts. It also eases separation of public facing encryption risks from private internal ones. If a public server is breached, all HTTPS traffic can be read, but if it proxies a more secure, perhaps simpler application environment (perhaps a microservice for the specific functionality), then that applica
Cites dfeojm-zlib · 2019-08 · on “EPYC SAP-SD 2-tier benchmark results”
On the post, if Linus is referring to low-end Xeon and workstation non-Xeon lacking ECC, I think it's completely idiotic. Nearly all infrastructure should be baking in ECC as standard rather than some "option" to not have silent, unknowable, probabilistic corruption that is realistically realizable on a near-daily basis given the orders of magnitude of network, storage and computational volumes of today (and the future) by ever lower tiers of end-users and common examples of network infrastructure. DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation (w speaker) [this video]
Cites failwhaleshark · 2021-05 · on “There’s no place for expensive laptops with 8GB of RAM anymore”
I want a laptop with 64 or 128 GiB of Chipkill ECC RAM. Any of this soldered-on, anti-R2R/-consumer Apple trend-copying is BS. This crap about "YAGNI" or "it costs too much" have no idea what they're talking about and don't understand the reasons or use-cases. At home, I may have a 96 core EPYC with 512 GiB of Reg'd ECC RAM, but it doesn't have the locality or reachability of something that's with you. Network presence and low-latency aren't a given. [LINK] Edit: Resources: [LINK] [LINK] [LINK] [PDF] [LINK] DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation (trivia: at the time of filming, I was excessively-hungover and laying across 6 seats in the middle of an empty area to the ex
Cites belter · 2021-07 · on “Single random bit flip causes error in certificate transparency log”
Indeed. See this one for the results of Bit-squatting the Windows Update domains: "DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation" [this video]
Cites hayst4ck · 2023-03 · on “Imaging a Hard Drive with Non-ECC Memory – What Could Go Wrong?”
Bit flips are totally real, at scale you will definitely see them on large queries. There was a fun talk at DEFCON on bitsquatting, the process of buying 1 bit off domain names and then accepting all incoming connections. Attacks like rowhammer similarly abuse erroneous bit flips. Supposedly microsoft can detect solar activity based on the number of windows crash logs they receive. DEFCON Talk: [this video] [LINK] [LINK]